CHRONOLOGY
OF VISITS AND REPORTS |
Since 1990, seven envoys have
been appointed by the United Nations system to facilitate dialogue
between the junta and the pro-democracy forces, and to carry out
fact-finding mission in Burma.
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Sadako
Ogata
(Japan)
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Independent Expert of the
UN Commission on Human Rights on the human rights situation
in Myanmar |
1 |
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Yozo
Yokota
(Japan)
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Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights Myanmar |
4 |
7 to 14 December 1992;
9 to 16 November 1993; 7 to 16 November 1994; 8 to 17 October
1995
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Rajsoomer
Lallah (Mauritius) |
Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights Myanmar |
0 |
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Alvaro
de Soto
(Peru)
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Assistant Secretary-General
for Political Affairs (1995-1997) / Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
for Myanmar (1997-1999) |
6 |
6 to 8 February 1995;
13 to 19 August 1995; 7 to 10 May 1997; 20 to 23 January
1998; 27 to 30 October 1998; 14 to 18 October 1999
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Paulo
Sergio Pinheiro (Brazil) |
Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights Myanmar |
7 |
3 to 5 April 2001; 9
to 17 October 2001; 10 to 19 February 2002; 17 to 28 October
2002; 19 to 24 March 2003; 3 to 8 November 2003; 11 to 15
November 2007
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Razali
Ismail
(Malaysia)
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Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
for Myanmar |
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29 June to 3 July 2000;
9 to 12 October 2000; 5 to 9 January 2001; 1 to 4 June 2001;
27 to 30 August 2001; 27 November to 3 December 2001; 23
to 26 April 2002; 2 to 6 August 2002; 12 to 16 November
2002; 6 to 10 June 2003; 30 September to 2 October 2003;
1 to 4 March 2004
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Ibrahim
Gambari (Nigeria) |
UN Under-Secretary-General
for Political Affairs (2006-2007) / UN Special Advisor on Myanmar
(2007- current) |
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18 to 20 May 2006; 9
to 12 November 2006; 29 September to 2 October 2007; 3 to
8 November 2007; 6 to 10 March 2008; 18 to 23 August 2008.
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| 2008-current |
Thomás
Ojea Quintana (Argentina) |
Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights Myanmar |
1 |
3 to 7 August 2008; |
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1990
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In November, the Independent
Expert of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Sadako Ogata,
visited Burma.
In her December report on
her visit submitted to the CHR on her visit, Ogata indicated
that it had not been determined when the representatives of
the Pyithu Hluttaw (Parliament) elected in May would be convened
to draft Burma’s new constitution.
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1992
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On 10 June, the Commission
on Human Rights appointed Yozo Yokota as UN Special Rapporteur
on human rights in Burma to implement the Commission’s
resolution 1992/58.
In December, the State Law
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) told the UN Special
Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Yozo Yokota that the representatives
elected in the 1990 elections would be tasked with drafting
Burma’s new constitution through the National Convention.
However, the NLD – who had won 392 of the 485 seats
in the 1990 election - was allowed to send only 97 MPs out
of the 702 delegates named to the National Convention. SLORC
also told Yokota that they were “sincere” in their
wish to cooperate with the United Nations. Yokota however
noted that SLORC authoritiesdid not extend him “full
and unreserved cooperation” during the visit. He was
not allowed to see any of the detainees he had requested to
meet, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
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1993
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On 10
November, SLORC Secretary-1, Lieutenant General Khin
Nyunt, told UN Special Rapporteur Yozo Yokota that it was
“still too early” for a visit to Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi, but that it might be “perhaps possible in the
future.” When asked if the SLORC intended to release
her on 20 July 1994, Khin Nyunt answered that it was still
too early to say. |
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CHR, 49th session, 17 February
1993, E/CN.4/1993/37 |
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UNGA, 48th session, 16 November 1993, A/48/578 |
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1994
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In his February report
to the Commission on Human Rights, UN Special Rapporteur on
human rights in Burma Yozo Yokota said that given the composition
of the delegates (only one out of seven delegates was elected
in the May 1990 elections), the restrictions imposed upon
the delegates, and the general guidelines to be strictly followed,
the National Convention did not constitute the necessary “steps
towards the restoration to democracy.”
On 20 September, SLORC Chairman
Than Shwe and SLORC Secretary-1, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt,
met with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. A second meeting between Khin
Nyunt and Daw Suu was held in October.
On 14 November, SLORC Secretary-1,
General Khin Nyunt, assured UN Special Rapporteur on human
rights in Burma Yozo Yokota that once the new constitution
had been drafted and adopted elections would take place and
a civilian government would take power. Khin Nyunt said that
it was not the moment to specify when a new civilian government
would be formed under the new constitution. However, he said
the junta wanted to complete the National Convention “as
soon as possible.” Yokota requested to visit Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi, but Khin Nyunt said that it was not the appropriate
moment for a visit as the junta was holding discussions with
her and did not want any interference in that dialogue. Khin
Nyunt said they intended to continue its dialogue with Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi in the future.
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CHR, 50th session, 16 February
1994, E/CN.4/1994/57 |
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UNGA, 49th session, 28 October
1994, A/49/594 |
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1995
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In his January report
to the Commission on Human Rights, UN Special Rapporteur on
Human Rights in Burma Yozo Yokota said that given the composition
of the delegates (only one out of seven delegates was elected
in the May 1990 elections), the restrictions imposed upon
the delegates, and the general guidelines to be strictly followed,
the National Convention did not constitute the necessary “steps
towards the restoration to democracy.”
In February, the SLORC informed
Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Alvaro de
Soto that although no meetings had been held with Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi since the end of October, it was the junta's intention
to meet again with the pro-democracy leader.
On 10 July, Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi was released from house arrest. The following day,
she told reporters she was dedicated to the restoration in
Burma and called for a dialogue between the military junta,
the democracy movement and non-Burman ethnic nationality groups.
She also urged a rethinking of foreign investment in Burma.
In August, Assistant Secretary-General
for Political Affairs Alvaro de Soto tried to encourage the
SLORC to open a substantive political dialogue with Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi and other elected political leaders. In reply,
SLORC pointed out that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was an ordinary
citizen, that in 1990 there were as many as 230 political
parties with which it would be impossible to establish a dialogue,
and that it would not be fair to single out only one of them.
The SLORC also said that nothing should be done to detract
attention from the National Convention, which was the designated
forum for political dialogue.
On 16 October, SLORC Secretary-1,
Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, assured the UN Special Rapporteur
on Human Rights in Burma Yozo Yokota that the junta had direct
contact with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, but it had so many important
tasks to achieve in terms of economic and social development
that at that time it was not a priority to resume its dialogue
with her.
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CHR, 51st session, 12 January
1995, E/CN.4/1995/65 |
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CHR, 51st session, 21 February
1995, E/CN.4/1995/150 |
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UNGA, 50th session, 16 October 1995, A/50/568 |
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UNGA, 50th session, 24 November 1995, A/50/782 |
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1996
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In his February report
to the Commission on Human Rights, UN Special Rapporteur,
Yozo Yokota, said that given the composition of the delegates
(only one out of seven delegates was elected in the May 1990
elections), the restrictions imposed upon the delegates, and
the general guidelines to be strictly followed, the National
Convention did not constitute the necessary “steps towards
the restoration to democracy.”
On 4 April, SLORC Foreign
Minister Ohn Gyaw told Assistant Secretary-General for Political
Affairs Alvaro de Soto that the National Convention continued
to be the only forum for a dialogue with political leaders,
including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Ohn Gyaw also said that the
SLORC’s priority was “national reconsolidation”
and the eradication of national insurgencies.
In his April report to the
Commission on Human Rights, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
expressed regret that the SLORC did not follow up on the release
of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other prominent political leaders
with the opening of a substantive dialogue as called for by
the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights.
On 12 May, UN Special Rapporteur
on Human Rights in Burma Yozo Yokota resigned, claiming he
did not have the resources to carry out his work. In June,
the Commission on Human Rights appointed Rajsoomer Lallah
as the new UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma.
In his November report to
the General Assembly, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan expressed
disappointment that it had not been possible for his envoys
to visit Burma since the adoption of resolution 50/194 in
December 1995. Annan also expressed “regret” that
no progress could be reported in the areas on which the General
Assembly and the Human Rights Commission had repeatedly expressed
concern.
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CHR, 52nd session, 5 February
1996, E/CN.4/1996/65 |
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CHR, 52nd session, 17 April 1996,
E/CN.4/1996/157 |
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UNGA, 51st session, 8 October 1996, A/51/466 |
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UNGA, 51st session, 8 November 1996, A/51/660 |
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1997
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In July, SLORC Secretary-1
Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt met with NLD Chairman Aung Shwe
and two members of the party’s Central Executive Committee.
On 1 October, SLORC Foreign
Minister Ohn Gyaw reiterated that a substantive political
dialogue with the NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was only possible
within the framework of the National Convention. Ohn Gyaw
suggested that contacts with the NLD might be held in stages,
leaving open the possibility that they might lead to discussions
on substantive matters. Ohn Gyaw also refused to give a time-frame
for the resumption of the National Convention, which had not
convened since March 1996.
In his November report to
the General Assembly, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan welcomed
contacts between the junta and the NLD as an initial step
for a genuine political dialogue. Annan also welcomed the
fact that the NLD could hold a party congress. He expressed
“disappointment” that no further progress had
been made with regard to the areas of concern of the General
Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights.
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CHR, 53rd session, 6 February
1997, E/CN.4/1997/64 |
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UNGA, 52nd session, 16 October 1997, A/52/484 |
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UNGA, 52nd session, 10 November 1997, A/52/587 |
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1998
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On 17 April, UN Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma Rajsoomer Lallah said
that two years after assuming the mandate he had seen “no
change in the political or human rights situation” in
Burma. Lallah said that the military regime did not wish to
engage in a political dialogue unless the NLD ceased its political
activities.
In 18 August, SLORC Secretary-1,
Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, met with NLD Chairman Aung
Shwe. The junta considered the meeting fruitful and expected
it would be the first of a series of confidence-building talks
between the regime and the NLD. However, the junta used the
NLD’s 21 August 1998 call for the convening of the parliament
as a pretext for not holding follow-up meetings with the party
Chairman.
In October, the SPDC justified
the curtailment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom of movement
out of concerns for her own safety. The junta claimed that
Daw Suu’s call for a boycott of investment and tourism
and her support of sanctions had rendered her “widely
unpopular.”
In his November report to
the General Assembly, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed
his “disappointment” for the lack of genuine,
substantive progress on the part of the SPDC in addressing
the recommendations of previous General Assembly resolutions.
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CHR, 54th session, 15 January 1998, E/CN.4/1998/70 |
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UNGA, 53rd session, 10 September 1998, A/53/364 |
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UNGA, 53rd session, 10 November
1998, A/53/657 |
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1999
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In his October
report to the General Assembly, UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan said that there was no concrete progress on issues of
concern of the General Assembly and the Commission on Human
Rights. |
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CHR, 55th session, 22 January 1999, E/CN.4/1999/35 |
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UNGA, 54th session, 4 October 1999, A/54/440 |
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UNGA, 54th session, 27 October
1999, A/54/499 |
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2000
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On 4 April, UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan appointed Razali Ismail as UN Special Envoy for
Burma. His mandate was to facilitate the implementation of
the UN General Assembly resolution 54/186.
On 24 August, Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi and a dozen other NLD leaders were stopped near Dala,
on the outskirts of Rangoon. On 2 September,
after a nine-day standoff, SPDC authorities brought Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi and the NLD leaders back to Rangoon and confined
them to their homes. On 14 September, SPDC
authorities lifted the restrictions. However, on 21
September, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders
attempted to travel to Mandalay. The regime brought Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi back from the Rangoon train station and again
confined her to her home.
In his October report to
the General Assembly, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed
hopes that Razali’s discussions with the SPDC’s
top leadership and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would result in “a
new momentum for a resumption of the process of dialogue between
the two sides” in the following months.
On 26 October, UN Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma Rajsoomer Lallah said
that the policy of SPDC over the past several years still
continued to “privilege the repression of all political
activity over the engagement in a genuine political dialogue.”
Lallah concluded that it was an “unfortunate and regrettable
duty” to address the UN General Assembly year after
year to report on a human right situation that showed no improvement
and discarded the repeated resolutions of this Assembly and
the Commission on Human Rights.
On 2 November 2000, UN Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma Rajsoomer Lallah resigned,
citing lack of logistical and administrative support from
the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. “I
see very little changing, year after year the General Assembly
and the Commission pass resolutions, I feel rather disappointed,”
he said following his resignation. Lallah was never allowed
to enter Burma during his four-year mandate.
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CHR, 56th session, 24 January 2000, E/CN.4/2000/38 |
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UNGA, 55th session, 22 August 2000, A/55/359 |
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UNGA, 55th session, 20 October
2000, A/55/509 |
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2001
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In January, the SPDC began
releasing political prisoners, relaxing the rules restricting
political activities, and allowing NLD township offices in
Rangoon and Mandalay districts to reopen.
On 6 February, the Commission
on Human Rights appointed Paulo Sergio Pinheiro to serve as
the new UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma. “I
am very encouraged by recent positive and constructive developments
in Myanmar, especially with regard to the progress in the
field of national reconciliation,” Pinheiro said after
his appointment.
In his August report to
the General Assembly, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights
in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro said that against the background
of ongoing talks between the SPDC and the NLD there had been
some positive signals indicative of the junta’s endeavor
to make progress in the area of human rights. Among the positive
developments, Pinheiro highlighted the dissemination of human
rights standards for public officials, the work of the SPDC’s
Committee on Human Rights, the release of political detainees,
the reopening of branches of the NLD, the continued international
monitoring of prison conditions, and the cooperation with
the Commission on Human Rights.
In October, after an interval
of six years, the SPDC and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi resumed talks
on national reconciliation. The specific details of the process
were not known, as both sides agreed to maintain the substance
of their discussions confidential. UN Special Envoy for Burma
Razali Ismail was the catalyst behind the “secret talks”
between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the military regime. Razali
had visited Burma several times with a view to facilitating
dialogue between the two sides.
In October, SPDC Secretary-1
Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt assured UN Special Rapporteur
on human rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro of the junta’s
full cooperation. Khin Nyunt told Pinheiro that the junta
was genuinely committed to improving the well-being of the
population. Khin Nyunt also acknowledged the need to improve
human rights and engage in political transition.
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UNGA, 56th session, 20 August
2001, A/56/312 |
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UNGA, 56th session, 24 October 2001, A/56/505 |
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2002
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On 6
May, the SPDC released Daw Aung San Suu Kyi after
19 months of house arrest. On the same day, the SPDC issued
a statement entitled “Turning of a New Page”,
which read: “[…] We shall recommit ourselves to
allowing all of our citizens to participate freely in the
life of our political process, while giving priority to national
unity, peace and stability of the country.” Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi commented on that occasion that it marked the
end of the confidence building phase of secret talks between
herself and the SPDC, which had been facilitated by the UN
Special Envoy for Burma Razali Ismail in September 2000. Her
release occurred following Razali’s seventh visit to
Rangoon. Pinheiro referred to the recent developments as a
“new phase of testing confidence building in action”.
He also said that the atmosphere surrounding Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi’s release was reported to be much better than
it was in 1995. Pinheiro concluded by saying that the move
from the “confidence-building phase to the beginning
of a dialogue on substantive political and constitutional
issues in Burma must be supported by all means available.”
On 21 November,
the SPDC released 115 prisoners, including members of the
NLD. It was the largest single release of prisoners since
the beginning of the process of confidence building between
the SPDC and the NLD in October 2000.
In his December
report to the Commission on Human Rights, UN Special Rapporteur
on human rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro stated that
the release of prisoners demonstrated the “continuing
goodwill of the SPDC to ease the political atmosphere.”
Pinheiro said that as a result of the climate of political
expectancy generated by the “secret talks” initiated
two years earlier, repression of peaceful political activities
had somewhat softened. “The 6 May 2002 statement by
the SPDC was interpreted by many Burmese citizens as a signal
that a page effectively had been turned and that the space
for political activities was being reopened,” concluded
Pinheiro. |
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CHR, 58th session, 10 January 2002, E/CN.4/2002/45 |
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CHR, 58th session, 18 March 2002, E/CN.4/2002/35 |
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UNGA, 57th session, 9 August 2002,
A/57/290 |
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CHR, 59th session, 27 December
2002, E/CN.4/2003/41 |
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2003
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On 22 March, the UN Special
Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro
interrupted his visit to Burma after discovering a listening
device placed under the table in the room where he was conducting
interviews with political prisoners in Rangoon’s Insein
prison. On 31 March, Pinheiro addressed the
UN Commission on Human Rights, criticizing the SPDC’s
lack of progress in talks. “[…] Progress has regrettably
been very limited and not at the pace or level that I had
expected,” Pinheiro said.
On 30 May, NLD members and
supporters accompanying Daw Aung San Suu Kyi were attacked
by pro-junta thugs near Depayin, Sagaing Division. As a result,
more than 100 NLD members and elected MP, supporters, monks
and students, were arrested, killed, wounded and missing.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, her deputy Tin Oo, and other NLD leaders,
were subsequently detained.
In July, UN Special Envoy
Razali Ismail urged the UN and ASEAN to coordinate efforts
to obtain the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and promote
reconciliation. A UN spokesman stated that UN Secretary General
Kofi Annan expected Razali to “work with government
officials toward her immediate and unconditional release.”
Following intense international pressure,
the SPDC allowed UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail to visit Rangoon
from 6 to 10 June. The regime successfully
hijacked the agenda so that instead of facilitating dialogue,
Mr Razali’s efforts were focused on obtaining a brief
meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Than Shwe chose to snub
Razali and show his contempt for the UN process by going on
a beach vacation during Razali’s trip.
In his August report to
the UN General Assembly, the UN Special Rapporteur on human
rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro said that “the
deadlock symptoms with regard to the dialogue and escalating
political tensions contributed to setting the scene for the
tragic events of the night of 30 May, followed by a significant
deterioration of the human rights situation.” “The
30 May incident has undone in one stroke all the progress
that had been achieved since the process of dialogue began
in 2000”, Pinheiro added.
On 30 August, the new SPDC
Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt announced the regime’s
“seven-point roadmap to democracy.” The roadmap
was a response to heightened regional and international pressure
following the Depayin massacre. Some members of the international
community hailed it as a positive initiative towards a process
of political transition.
On 8 September, UN Special
Envoy for Burma Razali Ismail announced that the SPDC had
scrapped plans for him to visit Burma that month.
On 29 September, at the
UN General Assembly, SPDC Foreign Minister Win Aung responded
to criticism that the SPDC was not committed to democratization
and reconciliation by assuring that they had “the political
will,” Win Aung also attempted to reduce pressure regarding
Daw Suu, saying, “We don’t call this house arrest.”
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UNGA, 58th session, 5 August 2003,
UN Doc A/58/219 |
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2004
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On 4 March, at the end
of a four-day visit to Burma, UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail
emerged confident that SPDC-NLD relations were improving.
Razali said SPDC Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt appeared
committed to allowing democracy, but needed “more power
to push it through.” “I am convinced that the
Prime Minister wants to move the process forward all the way
to democracy,” Razali said. Razali also said that Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi wanted to “turn the page” and
work “in a harmonized relationship” with the junta.
During his talks with Gen Khin Nyunt and NLD leader Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi, Razali was said to have suggested the creation
of a “constitution-drafting council” ahead of
the National Convention. The forum would allow a tripartite
dialogue between the junta, the NLD, and the ethnic nationalities.
Having failed once again to secure Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s
release, or any breakthrough in the democratization process,
Razali was nevertheless “encouraged by the expressions
of commitment of the Prime Minister to implement, in an all-inclusive
manner, the Government’s seven-step roadmap, starting
with the reconvening of the National Convention.”
The regime’s “pragmatists”,
Foreign Minister Win Aung and Prime Minister General Khin
Nyunt continued to mesmerize the international community with
promises to release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and include the NLD
in the National Convention. UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail
expressed similar optimism following his visit to Rangoon
in early March. He said that 16 April had been fixed as an
“informal deadline” for the Nobel Laureate’s
release. Razali had to set a new deadline for Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi’s release after the National Convention started
without her in May 2004. Razali said the NLD leader’s
detention was unacceptable and that he hoped to set a timeframe
for her release "well before" ASEAN’s annual
summit in Vientiane, Laos, in November.
With the departure of SPDC Foreign Minister
Win Aung on 18 September, Razali’s
standing with the regime weakened. Win Aung was considered
a “moderate”, in favor of engagement with the
international community and close to General Khin Nyunt, the
junta’s PM and main interlocutor to Razali.
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CHR, 60th session,
5 January 2004, E/CN.4/2004/33 |
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UNGA, 59th session,
30 August 2004, A/59/311 |
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CHR, 61st session, 2 December
2004, E/CN.4/2005/36 |
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2005
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In his March report to
the Commission on Human Rights, UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan said that the National Convention did not adhere to
the recommendations made by successive resolutions of the
UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights.
Annan appealed to the SPDC to “resume without delay
a substantive political dialogue with the representatives
of all ethnic nationality groups and political leaders, including
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, to help achieve a genuine process of
national reconciliation.”
In December, UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan designated UN Under-Secretary-General for
Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari to conduct the first-ever
briefing on Burma at the UN Security Council. The UNSC heard
the briefing on Burma on 16 December. Gambari
became the UN Secretary General envoy for Burma.
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CHR, 61st session, 7 March 2005,
E/CN.4/2005/130 |
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UNGA, 60th session, 12 August 2005, A/60/221 |
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2006
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In January, UN Special
Envoy for Burma Razali Ismail resigned frustrated at being
barred from entering the country for nearly two years. “My
contract lapsed after December 2005. It is clear they [the
military junta] do not want me back,” Razali said. “I
have not been allowed to visit the [Burma] leadership in [Rangoon]
in the past 22 months.” Razali visited Burma 12 times
as Special Envoy.
On 20 May, UN Under-Secretary-General for
Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari met with Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi. He was the first foreigner who had been allowed to visit
Daw Suu since Razali’s last mission to Burma in March
2004. Gambari’s unexpected meeting with Daw Suu prompted
speculation that Daw Suu would be released when her detention
expired on 27 May. These expectations were heightened when
SPDC police chief Maj-Gen Khin Yi publicly admitted that Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest was unlikely
to pose a threat to the country’s political stability.
However, on 27 May, the SPDC extended Daw
Suu’s detention for another year.
On 31 May, Gambari briefed
the UN Security Council on his visit to Burma. At the briefing,
Gambari expressed the UN Secretariat’s disappointment
over the SPDC’s failure to release Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi.
On 27 November, Gambari
briefed the UN Security Council on his 9-12 November trip
to Burma. Gambari said the military authorities had made “some
small steps” since his previous visit in May, but he
warned that the “good offices” process of the
Secretary General towards Burma “cannot be open ended.”
“We are now waiting for the government to [take] further
steps to respond to the concerns of the international community.
The ball is clearly in the court of the government,”
he added.
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CHR, 62nd session, 7 February
2006, E/CN.4/2006/34 |
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UNGA, 61st session, 21 September
2006, A/61/369 |
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2007
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In his February
report to the UN Human Rights Committee (former Commission
on Human Rights), UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in
Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro concluded that the SPDC had decided
to refuse to cooperate with the Human Rights Council. The
human rights concerns enumerated in the report were the same
as those highlighted in his previous reports since 2001. Pinheiro
said that the willingness to address human rights problems,
which the SPDC had shown six years earlier, had disappeared.
Pinheiro said the SPDC had not demonstrated any willingness
to concede space for a political opening, nor for the promised
move towards democratization.
On 22 May,
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon designated Ibrahim Gambari
as his Special Advisor on Burma. In this capacity, Gambari
continued the “good offices” role that he had
performed as the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs.
On 5 October,
both UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and UN Special Advisor
on Burma Ibrahim Gambari addressed UN Security Council members
on the situation in Burma. Ban Ki-moon said that the use of
force to put down peaceful protests in Burma was “abhorrent
and unacceptable.” He also urged the SPDC to release
detainees and start a dialogue with political opponents.
On 11 October,
the UN Security Council issued a statement “strongly”
deploring the SPDC’s repression of pro-democracy demonstrators
and called for the early release of all political prisoners
and remaining detainees. It also called on the SPDC and all
other parties concerned to work together towards a de-escalation
of the situation and a peaceful solution.
On 2 November,
the SPDC ordered the expulsion of UN humanitarian coordinator
in Rangoon, Charles Petrie. In a 24 October statement, Petrie
had criticized the junta for holding back Burma's development
and for not addressing high levels of malnutrition and poverty.
Petrie had also called on the junta to heed the voices of
protesters.
On 3 November,
UN Special Advisor on Burma Ibrahim Gambari visited Burma
in an attempt to kick start dialogue between the SPDC and
the NLD.
On 6 November,
SPDC Information Minister Kyaw Hsan told Gambari that his
proposal for UN-led tripartite dialogue between Gambari, the
junta, and Daw Aung San Kyi “will not be possible.”
Kyaw San also lectured Gambari about the UN’s ties with
“big power bullies” and voiced the SPDC’s
dissatisfaction with the outcome of Ganabri’s previous
visit, which was followed by sanctions from the US, Australia,
and the EU as well as condemnation from the UN Security Council.
On 11 November,
UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma Paulo Sergio
Pinheiro was allowed to visit the country for the first time
in four years. Pinheiro’s presence in Burma did not
deter the SPDC from arresting numerous activists in Rangoon.
The SPDC organized and controlled Pinheiro’s agenda.
Two of the five days of the mission were entirely devoted
to meetings with SPDC officials. Pinheiro was granted limited
access to monasteries, places of detention, and other locations
where human rights violations occurred. Pinheiro’s visits
to Insein Prison took place in an atmosphere of allegations
that the SPDC had transferred key political prisoners to other
location to prevent Pinheiro from meeting with them |
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HRC, 4th session, 12 February
2007, A/HRC/4/14 |
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HRC, 6th session, 7 December 2007, A/HRC/6/14 |
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2008
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On 6 March, UN Special Advisor
on Burma Ibrahim Gambari arrived in Burma for a five-day official
visit. On 7 March, Gambari met with SPDC Information Minister
Brigadier General Kyaw Hsan and other junta officials. Kyaw Hsan
roundly rejected UN requests for opening the constitutional drafting
process and more substantive political dialogue with Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi. “It is impossible to review or rewrite the
constitution […],” Kyaw Hsan said. Kyaw Hsan also
accused Gambari of “bias” and “act[ing] outside
[his] role as mediator” by releasing a statement from Daw
Suu in November. He expressed unhappiness with Gambari's trips
to other countries in the region and warned that his role as an
“impartial adviser” would be brought into question
if he follows suggestions from Western nations. Gambari also met
with members of the SPDC-appointed referendum commission. The
regime rejected offers of UN technical assistance and help with
providing observers at the referendum. Referendum commissioner
Thaung Nyunt told Gambari the military had enough experience with
running elections.
On 14 March, UN Special Rapporteur
on human rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro slammed the SPDC
for its patently false claims of democratization. “There
is a contradiction between what the government of Myanmar says
it is doing, and what is really happening,” Pinheiro said.
“If you believe in gnomes, trolls, and elves, you can believe
in this process of democracy in Myanmar,” he added. “No
referendum or elections can be fair, no transition to democracy
can be effective, without the release of political prisoners,
the authorization for all political parties to operate, and the
protection of the basic civil and political freedoms, all non-existent
in Myanmar,” Pinheiro concluded. The SPDC denied Pinheiro
a travel visa despite a UN Human Rights Council request for a
follow-up visit. in Myanmar,” Pinheiro concluded. The SPDC
denied Pinheiro a travel visa despite a UN Human Rights Council
request for a follow-up visit.
In his last report presented to the Human Rights
Council as UN Special Rapporteur on Burma in March,
Pinheiro said that the SPDC’s willingness to address human
rights abuses had “disappeared.”
On 28 March, the Human Rights
Council appointed Argentine Tomás Ojea Quintana as the
new UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma.
On 6 June, in his first report
to the Human Rights Council, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights
in Burma Tomás Ojea Quintana said that the human rights
situation in Burma had not improved since the previous report
and critical issues still had to be addressed. Ojea Quintana also
said that the SPDC’s constitutional referendum process lacked
transparency, free debate, and dissemination of information among
the public.
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HRC, 7th session, 5 March 2008,
A/HRC/7/18 |
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HRC, 7th session, 7 March 2008, A/HRC/7/24 |
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HRC, 8th session, 3 June 2008, A/HRC/8/12 |
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