In her December report on her visit submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights on her visit, Ogata indicated that it had not been determined when the representatives of the Parliament elected in May would be convened to draft Burma’s new constitution.

In December, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) told the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Yozo Yokota that the representatives elected in the 1990 elections would be tasked with drafting Burma’s new constitution through the National Convention. However, the NLD – who had won 392 of the 485 seats in the 1990 election - was allowed to send only 97 MPs out of the 702 delegates named to the National Convention. SLORC also told Yokota that they were “sincere” in their wish to cooperate with the United Nations. Yokota however noted that SLORC authoritiesdid not extend him “full and unreserved cooperation” during the visit. He was not allowed to see any of the detainees he had requested to meet, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

On 20 September, SLORC Chairman Sr Gen Than Shwe and SLORC Secretary-1 Lt Gen Khin Nyunt met with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. A second meeting between Khin Nyunt and Daw Suu was held in October.

On 14 November, SLORC Secretary-1 Lt Gen Khin Nyunt assured UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Yozo Yokota that once the new constitution had been drafted and adopted elections would take place and a civilian government would take power. Khin Nyunt said that it was not the moment to specify when a new civilian government would be formed under the new constitution. However, he said the junta wanted to complete the National Convention “as soon as possible.” Yokota requested to visit Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, but Khin Nyunt said that it was not the appropriate moment for a visit as the junta was holding discussions with her and did not want any interference in that dialogue. Khin Nyunt said they intended to continue its dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in the future.

In February, the SLORC informed UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Alvaro de Soto that although no meetings had been held with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi since the end of October, it was the junta's intention to meet again with the pro-democracy leader.

On 10 July, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest. The following day, she told reporters she was dedicated to the restoration in Burma and called for a dialogue between the military junta, the democracy movement and non-Burman ethnic nationality groups. She also urged a rethinking of foreign investment in Burma.

In August, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Alvaro de Soto tried to encourage the SLORC to open a substantive political dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other elected political leaders. In reply, SLORC pointed out that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was an ordinary citizen, that in 1990 there were as many as 230 political parties with which it would be impossible to establish a dialogue, and that it would not be fair to single out only one of them. The SLORC also said that nothing should be done to detract attention from the National Convention, which was the designated forum for political dialogue.

On 16 October, SLORC Secretary-1 Lt Gen Khin Nyunt assured the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Yozo Yokota that the junta had direct contact with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, but it had so many important tasks to achieve in terms of economic and social development that at that time it was not a priority to resume its dialogue with her.

On 4 April, SLORC Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw told UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Alvaro de Soto that the National Convention continued to be the only forum for a dialogue with political leaders, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Ohn Gyaw also said that the SLORC’s priority was “national reconsolidation” and the eradication of national insurgencies.

In his April report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed regret that the SLORC did not follow up on the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other prominent political leaders with the opening of a substantive dialogue as called for by the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights.

On 12 May, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Yozo Yokota resigned, claiming he did not have the resources to carry out his work. In June, the UN Commission on Human Rights appointed Rajsoomer Lallah as the new UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma.

In his November report to the UN General Assembly, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed disappointment that it had not been possible for his envoys to visit Burma since the adoption of resolution 50/194 in December 1995. Annan also expressed “regret” that no progress could be reported in the areas on which the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights had repeatedly expressed concern.

On 1 October, SLORC Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw reiterated that a substantive political dialogue with the NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was only possible within the framework of the National Convention. Ohn Gyaw suggested that contacts with the NLD might be held in stages, leaving open the possibility that they might lead to discussions on substantive matters. Ohn Gyaw also refused to give a time-frame for the resumption of the National Convention, which had not convened since March 1996.

In his November report to the UN General Assembly, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan welcomed contacts between the junta and the NLD as an initial step for a genuine political dialogue. Annan also welcomed the fact that the NLD could hold a party congress. He expressed “disappointment” that no further progress had been made with regard to the areas of concern of the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights.

In 18 August, SLORC Secretary-1 Lt Gen Khin Nyunt met with NLD Chairman Aung Shwe. The junta considered the meeting fruitful and expected it would be the first of a series of confidence-building talks between the regime and the NLD. However, the junta used the NLD’s 21 August 1998 call for the convening of the parliament as a pretext for not holding follow-up meetings with the party Chairman.

In October, the SPDC justified the curtailment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom of movement out of concerns for her own safety. The junta claimed that Daw Suu’s call for a boycott of investment and tourism and her support of sanctions had rendered her “widely unpopular.”

In his November report to the UN General Assembly, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed his “disappointment” for the lack of genuine, substantive progress on the part of the SPDC in addressing the recommendations of previous UN General Assembly resolutions.

On 24 August, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and a dozen other NLD leaders were stopped near Dala, on the outskirts of Rangoon. On 2 September, after a nine-day standoff, SPDC authorities brought Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD leaders back to Rangoon and confined them to their homes. On 14 September, SPDC authorities lifted the restrictions. However, on 21 September, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders attempted to travel to Mandalay. The regime brought Daw Aung San Suu Kyi back from the Rangoon train station and again confined her to her home.

In his October report to the UN General Assembly, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed hopes that Razali’s discussions with the SPDC’s top leadership and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would result in “a new momentum for a resumption of the process of dialogue between the two sides” in the following months.

On 26 October, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Rajsoomer Lallah said that the policy of SPDC over the past several years still continued to “privilege the repression of all political activity over the engagement in a genuine political dialogue.” Lallah concluded that it was an “unfortunate and regrettable duty” to address the UN General Assembly year after year to report on a human right situation that showed no improvement and discarded the repeated resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights.

On 2 November 2000, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Rajsoomer Lallah resigned, citing lack of logistical and administrative support from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. “I see very little changing, year after year the General Assembly and the Commission pass resolutions, I feel rather disappointed,” he said following his resignation. Lallah was never allowed to enter Burma during his four-year mandate.

On 6 February, the UN Commission on Human Rights appointed Paulo Sergio Pinheiro to serve as the new UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma. “I am very encouraged by recent positive and constructive developments in Myanmar, especially with regard to the progress in the field of national reconciliation,” Pinheiro said after his appointment.

In his August report to the UN General Assembly, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro said that against the background of ongoing talks between the SPDC and the NLD there had been some positive signals indicative of the junta’s endeavor to make progress in the area of human rights. Among the positive developments, Pinheiro highlighted the dissemination of human rights standards for public officials, the work of the SPDC’s Committee on Human Rights, the release of political detainees, the reopening of branches of the NLD, the continued international monitoring of prison conditions, and the cooperation with the UN Commission on Human Rights.

In October, after an interval of six years, the SPDC and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi resumed talks on national reconciliation. The specific details of the process were not known, as both sides agreed to maintain the substance of their discussions confidential. UN Special Envoy for Burma Razali Ismail was the catalyst behind the “secret talks” between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the military regime. Razali had visited Burma several times with a view to facilitating dialogue between the two sides.

In October, SPDC Secretary-1 Lt Gen Khin Nyunt assured UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro of the junta’s full cooperation. Khin Nyunt told Pinheiro that the junta was genuinely committed to improving the well-being of the population. Khin Nyunt also acknowledged the need to improve human rights and engage in political transition.

On 30 May, NLD members and supporters accompanying Daw Aung San Suu Kyi were attacked by pro-junta thugs near Depayin, Sagaing Division. As a result, more than 100 NLD members and elected MP, supporters, monks and students, were arrested, killed, wounded and missing. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, her deputy Tin Oo, and other NLD leaders, were subsequently detained.

In July, UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail urged the UN and ASEAN to coordinate efforts to obtain the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and promote reconciliation. A UN spokesman stated that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expected Razali to “work with government officials toward her immediate and unconditional release.”

Following intense international pressure, the SPDC allowed UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail to visit Rangoon from 6 to 10 June. The regime successfully hijacked the agenda so that instead of facilitating dialogue, Razali’s efforts were focused on obtaining a brief meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. SPDC Chairman Sr Gen Than Shwe chose to snub Razali and show his contempt for the UN process by going on a beach vacation during Razali’s trip.

In his August report to the UN General Assembly, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro said that “the deadlock symptoms with regard to the dialogue and escalating political tensions contributed to setting the scene for the tragic events of the night of 30 May, followed by a significant deterioration of the human rights situation.” “The 30 May incident has undone in one stroke all the progress that had been achieved since the process of dialogue began in 2000”, Pinheiro added.

On 30 August, the new SPDC Prime Minister Gen Khin Nyunt announced the regime’s “seven-point roadmap to democracy.” The roadmap was a response to heightened regional and international pressure following the Depayin massacre. Some members of the international community hailed it as a positive initiative towards a process of political transition.

On 8 September, UN Special Envoy for Burma Razali Ismail announced that the SPDC had scrapped plans for him to visit Burma that month.

On 29 September, at the UN General Assembly, SPDC Foreign Minister Win Aung responded to criticism that the SPDC was not committed to democratization and reconciliation by assuring that they had “the political will,” Win Aung also attempted to reduce pressure regarding Daw Suu, saying, “We don’t call this house arrest.”

In December, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan designated UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari to conduct the first-ever briefing on Burma at the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council heard the briefing on Burma on 16 December.

On 20 May, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari met with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. He was the first foreigner who had been allowed to visit Daw Suu since Razali’s last mission to Burma in March 2004. Gambari’s unexpected meeting with Daw Suu prompted speculation that Daw Suu would be released when her detention expired on 27 May. These expectations were heightened when SPDC police chief Maj Gen Khin Yi publicly admitted that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest was unlikely to pose a threat to the country’s political stability. However, on 27 May, the SPDC extended Daw Suu’s detention for another year.

On 31 May, Gambari briefed the UN Security Council on his visit to Burma. At the briefing, Gambari expressed the UN Secretariat’s disappointment over the SPDC’s failure to release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

On 27 November, Gambari briefed the UN Security Council on his 9-12 November trip to Burma. Gambari said the military authorities had made “some small steps” since his previous visit in May, but he warned that the “good offices” process of the Secretary General towards Burma “cannot be open ended.” “We are now waiting for the government to [take] further steps to respond to the concerns of the international community. The ball is clearly in the court of the government,” he added.